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Abstract 
I examine whether and to what extent tax uncertainty affects a firm’s dividend payouts. Based on 
the argument that tax uncertainty impairs the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash 
flows, I hypothesize and find that firms with greater tax uncertainty exhibit a lower probability of 
dividend payouts. The effect of tax uncertainty is stronger in the presence of financial constraints 
and weaker for firms that distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts. Furthermore, I find a 
negative effect of tax uncertainty on dividend levels, which is moderated by the costs of dividend 
reductions. These results are economically meaningful as a one standard deviation higher tax 
uncertainty leads to a 9.9 percentage point lower probability and a $23.6 million reduction in 
dividend payouts. Taken together, my findings document a real effect of tax avoidance and 
contribute to the understanding of interactions between uncertain tax avoidance and a firm’s 
financial ecosystem.  
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1.  Introduction 
Dividend payouts to shareholders are an integral part of a firm’s financial ecosystem 
(Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz 2014). In this study, I examine whether and to what extent 
tax uncertainty affects both the decision to distribute dividends and their amount. Goh, Lee, Lim, 
and Shevlin (2016) argue that shareholders benefit from tax avoidance as lower tax payments 
reduce the cost of equity. However, aside from diminishing tax payments, tax avoidance induces 
uncertainty (Neuman 2016) that affects overall firm risk (Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams 
2017), firm value (Drake, Lusch, and Stekelberg 2017), cash holdings (Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Saavedra 2017), and investment (Jacob, Wentland, and Wentland 2016). These effects of tax 
uncertainty, which constitutes the second dimension of a firm’s tax-avoidance strategy, cast 
doubt on the argument that shareholders necessarily benefit from tax avoidance.  
I define tax uncertainty as uncertainty in a firm’s tax position that leads to volatile tax 
payments over time.1 Uncertainty in this regard stems from “grey area” tax avoidance, which 
includes tax positions with ex-ante uncertainty and a high likelihood of being overturned in a tax 
audit (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2016). Although reducing tax payments (Edwards, Schwab, 
and Shevlin 2016), “grey area” tax avoidance raises IRS audit risk and the chance of future tax 
repayments, interest charges, and fines. As audit risk and the predictability of audit outcomes 
differ across countries, tax uncertainty is not fully idiosyncratic but conditional on country-
specific factors that are not directly under a firm’s control (e.g., the rule of law, audit effort, etc.). 
Recent anecdotes support the argument that tax uncertainty might adversely affect firms 
and their shareholders. A Financial Times report, for instance, suggests that an increasing 
number of U.S. firms alert their investors to the negative consequences of tax uncertainty for 
																																								 																				
1 To provide a direct conceptual link to dividends being paid out of after-tax cash flows, I limit the definition of tax 
uncertainty to potential cash effects.  
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after-tax cash flows (Houlder 2016). Based on the argument that uncertain tax payments impairs 
the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash flows, I hypothesize that tax uncertainty 
negatively affects dividend payouts.  
The hypothesized relation between tax uncertainty and dividend payouts rests on the 
argument that volatile tax payments contribute to overall cash-flow uncertainty. Uncertain cash 
flows impair the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash flows and increase the likelihood 
of liquidity shortfalls. As financing liquidity shortfalls in external capital markets is costly for a 
firm (Myers and Majluf 1984), managers consider cash-flow uncertainty when deciding on 
dividend payouts (Lintner 1956, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 2005). Further, firms with 
uncertain cash flows exhibit a lower probability of achieving persistent dividend levels over time 
(Chay and Suh 2009). Managers adjust dividend payouts to accommodate cash-flow uncertainty 
as capital markets heavily punish dividend reductions and impersistent dividend levels (Healy 
and Palepu 1988, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995). Thus, firms with greater tax uncertainty 
are less likely to distribute dividends and they exhibit lower dividend levels. 
Several arguments, however, suggest that the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend 
payouts is ex-ante unclear and therefore an empirical question. First, instead of adjusting 
dividend payouts, firms might delay investment to accommodate cash-flow uncertainty (Jacob et 
al. 2016). Second, volatility in tax payments might result from benign tax avoidance where the 
sources of variation in tax payments are known to managers (Guenther et al. 2017). Third, 
operating uncertainty might be the main driver of cash-flow uncertainty, which impedes 
evidence for an effect of tax uncertainty.  
To examine the decision to distribute dividends and the amount of dividend payouts, I 
obtain two samples of U.S. public firms with financial statement data for fiscal years 1993-2014. 
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I calculate the coefficient of variation of annual cash effective tax rates (ETRs) over five prior 
years as a proxy for tax uncertainty (McGuire, Neuman, and Omer 2013, Jacob et al. 2016). This 
is an intuitive measure as firms with uncertain tax positions exhibit more volatile tax payments 
over time (Neuman 2016). In this regard, past cash ETRs are less strongly affected by financial 
reporting incentives than ex-ante proxies for tax uncertainty (e.g., unrecognized tax benefits 
(UTBs); Robinson, Stomberg, and Towery 2015) and provide a direct conceptual link to 
dividends being paid out of after-tax cash flows. Furthermore, Drake et al. (2017) find that 
variation in past cash ETRs predicts volatility in tax payments, which allows managers to form 
expectations about future tax uncertainty. I add long-run cash ETRs (Dyreng Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2008) in all tests to segregate the level and the uncertainty of tax payments as the two 
dimensions of a firm’s tax-avoidance strategy.  
The first set of tests analyzes a firm’s decision to distribute dividends. Results indicate 
that firms with greater tax uncertainty exhibit a lower probability of dividend payouts. This 
effect is economically meaningful as a one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces the 
probability of dividend payouts by 9.9 percentage points. The effect of tax uncertainty is similar 
to non-tax determinants of dividend payouts, which seems reasonable as tax payments represent 
a major share of a firm’s after-tax cash flow where uncertainty is difficult to hedge.  
I conduct two cross-sectional tests to corroborate these results. First, I study financially 
constrained firms and expect a stronger effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts as these 
firms exhibit higher costs of external financing (Whited 1992, Faulkender and Petersen 2006). 
Results are in line with this expectation and suggest that the relevance of tax uncertainty 
increases in the costs of obtaining external funds. In addition, these results support the argument 
that tax uncertainty affects dividend payouts through the channel of cash-flow uncertainty. 
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Second, I analyze firms with high institutional ownership and predict a weaker effect of tax 
uncertainty as agency aspects dominate their dividend-payout decisions (Allen, Bernardo, and 
Welch 2000). Results are consistent with this prediction and suggest that managers consider 
volatile tax payments in a dividend-payout decision as the effect of tax uncertainty varies 
according to the motives for dividend payouts.  
The second set of tests examines dividend levels. For a subsample of dividend-paying 
firms, I find that firms with greater tax uncertainty exhibit lower dividend levels. The effect of 
tax uncertainty is again economically meaningful and comparable to non-tax determinants. A 
one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces dividend payouts by 10 percent, which is 
equivalent to lower dividend payouts to the tune of $23.6 million for the average dividend-
paying firm. Thus, tax uncertainty is a relevant determinant of observable dividend levels.  
In a third cross-sectional test, I examine young and growing firms at the capital-infusion 
stage (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2006). I expect a weaker effect of tax uncertainty on the 
amount of dividend payouts as these firms exhibit low costs of dividend reductions (Leary and 
Michaely 2011). Results are consistent with this expectation and suggest that the effect of tax 
uncertainty on dividend levels varies with the costs of reducing dividend payouts.  
In addition to cross-sectional tests, I conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses to assess the 
robustness of my baseline results. First, I investigate alternative measures for tax uncertainty and 
show that my results are unaffected by loss firms, winsorizing annual cash ETRs, more extreme 
forms of tax uncertainty, volatility in tax payments induced by benign tax-avoidance strategies, 
and endogeneity concerns. Second, I include firm-fixed effects in the regression, alleviating 
concerns that time-invariant firm characteristics might drive my results.  
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In a series of supplementary tests, I provide corroborating evidence for the effect of tax 
uncertainty on dividend payouts. First, I conduct time-series tests and show that tax uncertainty 
contributes to changes in dividend payouts over time. I also examine the 2003 dividend tax cut 
providing an exogenous shock to a firm’s payout policy and document that firms with high tax 
uncertainty reacted less strongly to the tax reform. Second, I show that the effect of tax 
uncertainty is independent from a firm’s operating uncertainty. This suggests that tax uncertainty 
is a dimension of overall firm risk having distinct effects on dividend payouts. Third, I examine 
the relation between tax uncertainty and the level of tax avoidance and find that tax-avoidance 
proxies do not capture underlying tax uncertainty. Finally, I study share repurchases as an 
alternative distribution channel (Skinner 2008). The effect of tax uncertainty on share 
repurchases is negative but weaker, which is in line with the argument that firms can adjust share 
repurchases more easily than dividend payouts (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 2000).  
My findings contribute to several streams of research and increase our understanding of 
interactions between uncertain tax avoidance and a firm’s financial ecosystem. First, the negative 
effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts constitutes a real effect of tax avoidance and thus 
answers the call for research in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). Together with the finding that 
volatility in tax payments has a negative effect on investment (Jacob et al. 2016), my results 
suggest that uncertain tax-avoidance strategies induce non-tax costs on shareholders. As 
investors select firms based on their payout policy (Desai and Jin 2011), uncertain tax avoidance 
might distort these decisions. 
Second, my findings add to a growing stream of research that examines determinants and 
consequences of tax uncertainty. I extend research by DeSimone, Mills, and Stomberg (2016) 
and Guenther et al. (2017), who find that tax uncertainty does not increase in the level of tax 
- 6 - 
avoidance. In this regard, my findings suggest that analyses of real effects of tax avoidance have 
to segregate the level and the uncertainty of tax payments to identify the driver of an effect. Thus, 
the finding that shareholders benefit from tax avoidance (Goh et al. 2016) might not exclusively 
result from lower tax payments but also from a lack of uncertainty in these payments.  
Third, my findings contribute to research on the determinants of dividend payouts (Chay 
and Suh 2009, Hoberg, Philipps, and Prabhala 2014) and suggest that tax uncertainty induces 
cross-sectional variation in the probability and the amount of dividend payouts. These findings 
should interest managers and shareholders as adverse effects of tax uncertainty on after-tax 
earnings are likely to affect dividend payouts. Further, my findings are relevant to legislators and 
suggest that initiatives to reduce volatility in tax payments (e.g., the U.S. Compliance Assurance 
Process; Beck and Lisowsky 2014) might increase the distribution potential of firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior research 
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample selection and the research design. 
Section 4 discusses the baseline results. Section 5 presents results for robustness tests and 
supplementary analyses. Section 6 summarizes my main findings and concludes.  
2.  Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1.  Determinants of Dividend Payouts 
Dividend payouts are a strategic tool in capital market economies. In 2014, firms listed 
on the S&P 500 distributed more than $900 billion to their shareholders, with motives for 
dividend payouts differing across firms. Starting with the seminal paper by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) showing that dividends do not affect investment and firm value, research has 
identified several determinants of dividend payouts (see Allen and Michaely (2003) and Farre-
- 7 - 
Mensa et al. (2014) for reviews).2 First, firms distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Excess cash holdings enable managers to privately divert 
funds (Jensen and Meckling 1976) or to engage in suboptimal investment (Jensen 1986). In this 
regard, dividend payouts constitute a disciplining device and managers are forced to raise funds 
under external scrutiny (Easterbrook 1984). In line with this argument, Officer (2011) finds that 
firms prone to agency conflicts exhibit higher dividend-initiation-announcement returns.  
Second, firms distribute dividends to convey privately-held information to the capital 
market (Bhattacharya 1979, John and Williams 1985, Miller and Rock 1985). Due to information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders, dividend payouts reveal private information 
and provide a signal for managers’ earnings expectations. Consistent with this argument, Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) find positive abnormal returns for dividend increases, while 
dividend reductions are heavily punished by capital markets.  
Third, firms distribute dividends due to a lack of investment opportunities. A limited 
investment set reduces cash requirements and raises the distribution potential (Smith and Watts 
1992). Based on this argument, DeAngelo et al. (2006) analyze the financial life-cycle theory 
and document a higher likelihood of dividend payouts for more mature firms. Chay and Suh 
(2009) investigate a risk-based argument and find a negative relation between cash-flow 
uncertainty and dividend payouts. Firms with large investment sets and uncertain cash flows 
adjust dividend payouts to avoid external financing and dividend reductions (Lintner 1956).  
Fourth, firms distribute dividends due to the relative investor-level tax on dividend 
payouts (Poterba 2004). In this regard, several studies examine the dividend tax cut introduced 
																																								 																				
2 Miller and Modigliani (1961) assume complete and perfect markets that rest on the following assumptions: (i) no 
taxes, (ii) symmetric information among market participants, (iii) complete contracting, (iv) no transaction costs, (v) 
competitive product and financial markets, and (vi) rational investors and managers (Farre-Mensa et al. 2014).  
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by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 and find that firms dominated by 
individual investors experienced the largest increase in dividend payouts (Chetty and Saez 2005, 
Blouin, Ready, and Shackelford 2004). In addition, Desai and Jin (2011) study different investor 
classes and document that investors tend to invest in a firm based on its payout policy. At the 
same time, managers adjust dividend payouts to cater for investors’ tax preferences. 
2.2.  Tax Uncertainty as the Second Dimension of a Firm’s Tax-Avoidance Strategy 
Cash savings in the form of lower tax payments incentivize firms to engage in tax 
avoidance (Edwards et al. 2016). Aside from this benefit, “grey area” tax avoidance might 
induce uncertainty which results from tax positions characterized by ex-ante uncertainty and a 
high likelihood of being challenged in a tax audit (Dyreng et al. 2016). Common examples of 
“grey area” tax avoidance are the application of ambiguous tax rules or legislation, and 
discretion in setting intra-group transfer prices. Although initially reducing tax payments, “grey 
area” tax avoidance raises IRS scrutiny and audit risk (Mills 1998). In case the IRS challenges a 
tax position, the firm might become liable for tax repayments, interest charges, and fines.  
Several public cases indicate that the disputed amounts and the cash effects of “grey area” 
tax avoidance could be economically significant. In 2006, GlaxoSmithKline Inc., for instance, 
settled a transfer-pricing dispute with the IRS. Being the largest dispute in the history of the IRS 
(IRS 2006), this settlement included fiscal years 1989-2005 and led to tax repayments of $3.4 
billion and an abandoned claim of $1.8 billion. In a similar case, the Canadian tax authorities 
accused Cameco Corp. of having engaged in “grey area” tax avoidance via intra-group transfer 
pricing and claimed tax repayments of $2.1 billion (Livesey 2016).3  
																																								 																				
3 GlaxoSmithKline Inc. engaged in income shifting through tax-deductable intra-group payments on intangible 
assets and trademarks. These payments reduced tax payments in the U.S. (IRS 2006). Cameco Corp. used a similar 
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Tax uncertainty is not driven by a firm’s tax-avoidance strategies alone but might depend 
on country-specific factors that are not directly under a firm’s control (e.g., tax enforcement, the 
rule of law, audit cycle and effort, etc.). Current developments in the European Union support 
this argument, as the EU Commission has started to tackle initially certain tax positions through 
state aid regulation. These rules prohibit EU member states from granting selective economic 
benefits to firms.4 Thus far, the EU Commission has qualified two tax rulings in Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands respectively as illegal state aid, leading to tax repayments of $20-30 million 
(EU Commission 2015a). In a recent decision, the EU Commission accused Apple Inc. of having 
avoided $13 billion through tax rulings in Ireland (EU Commission 2016).5 By challenging 
initially certain tax positions taken by a firm, these decisions increase tax uncertainty and 
contribute to volatility in tax payments over time.  
Prior research has examined the concept of tax uncertainty and provides some evidence 
for potential economic effects. Hanlon et al. (2017), for instance, examine cash holdings and find 
that firms with uncertain tax positions hold more precautionary cash. Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 
(2014) investigate debt contracts and show that the cost of debt increases with the level of tax 
avoidance. Consistent with Hanlon et al. (2017), Hasan et al. (2014) argue that tax uncertainty 
increases in the level of tax avoidance and therefore measure tax uncertainty with proxies for the 
level of tax avoidance (e.g., cash or GAAP ETRs, book-tax differences (BTDs), and UTBs). 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
strategy and set a low intra-group transfer price for uranium sold by a Canadian subsidiary to a Swiss letter-box 
company. This diminished the Canadian tax base and increased profits in the low-tax Canton of Zug (Livesey 2016).  
4 To examine whether a tax benefit constitutes illegal state aid, the EU Commission has to imitate an investigation 
procedure. If the EU Commission qualifies a tax benefit as state aid, tax authorities have to recover the benefit. Tax 
authorities and countries, however, may appeal against the decision of the EU Commission at the European Court of 
Justice (see Lang, Pistone, Schuch, and Staringer (2015, pp. 121–130) for further information).  
5 In its 2015 financial statements, Apple discussed potential effects of this decision on its after-tax cash flows by 
stating that if “… the European Commission were to conclude against Ireland, it could require Ireland to recover 
from the Company past taxes covering a period of up to 10 years reflective of the disallowed state aid, and such 
amount could be material.” An investigation of McDonald’s Corp.’s tax positions in Luxembourg is still ongoing 
with the EU Commission (EU Commission 2015b).  
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Several recent studies, in contrast, suggest that tax uncertainty is unrelated to the level of 
tax avoidance. Benefits of tax avoidance in the form of cash savings (Mills 1998, Edwards et al. 
2016) or reduced leverage (Graham and Tucker 2006) do not necessarily induce greater tax 
uncertainty. This follows from the argument that firms could engage in tax-avoidance strategies 
that reduce tax payments without increasing tax uncertainty (e.g., benign tax avoidance through 
R&D tax credits, accelerated depreciation, etc.). In this regard, Guenther et al. (2017) show that 
low cash ETRs are more persistent over time than high cash ETRs and that the level of tax 
avoidance is unrelated to future volatility in tax payments. Hutchens and Rego (2015) explore 
the relation between tax uncertainty and overall firm risk more closely. Their findings suggest 
that overall firm risk is unrelated to the level of tax avoidance but increases with tax uncertainty. 
Drake et al. (2017) examine value implications and find that tax uncertainty mitigates the 
positive valuation of tax avoidance. With regard to firm-level investment, Jacob et al. (2016) 
document that tax uncertainty delays large capital investment and reduces capital expenditures.  
2.3.  Hypothesis Development 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that tax uncertainty affects firms and their 
operations. Firms with greater tax uncertainty have a higher probability of unexpected tax 
payments; this leads to volatile tax payments over time and impairs the persistence and 
predictability of after-tax cash flows. Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers are aware of 
the negative effects of tax uncertainty on after-tax cash flows. A recent Financial Times report, 
for instance, indicates that the number of U.S. firms that alert their investors to the likelihood of 
higher and more volatile tax payments has significantly increased. 136 U.S. firms, including 
prominent examples such as LinkedIn Corp. and Yahoo Inc., issued an alert in their 2015 
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financial statements (Houlder 2016). These firms expect that tax uncertainty adversely affects 
after-tax earnings as well as cash flows available for dividend payouts.  
On a theoretical level, two arguments suggest that tax uncertainty, through the channel of 
cash-flow uncertainty, affects decisions to distribute dividends. First, information asymmetries 
between managers and investors imply differences in the costs of internal and external financing. 
Internal financing (e.g., through retained earnings) is less costly than raising capital in external 
financial markets (Myers and Majluf 1984). In a dividend-payout decision, managers forecast 
cash requirements to avoid liquidity shortfalls and costly external financing (Chay and Suh 2009). 
As cash-flow uncertainty increases the likelihood of liquidity shortfalls (Lintner 1956), firms 
with greater tax uncertainty are expected to exhibit a lower probability of dividend payouts.  
Second, dividend payouts enable investors to form earnings expectations. A reduction in 
dividend payouts affects these expectations (Healy and Palepu 1988), leading to capital-market 
punishment (Michaely et al. 1995, Grullon et al. 2002). Managers are, therefore, reluctant to 
reduce dividend payouts and aim to distribute persistent dividend levels over time. Moreover, 
managers initiate dividend payouts only if they are confident of maintaining the dividend level. 
As cash-flow uncertainty impairs the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash flows, tax 
uncertainty reduces the probability of persistent dividend levels. This suggests that firms with 
greater tax uncertainty are less likely to distribute dividends. 
Taken together, tax uncertainty raises the likelihood of liquidity shortfalls and dividend 
reductions. As both effects impose costs in the form of external financing and negative capital 
market reactions, greater tax uncertainty is expected to reduce the probability of dividend 
payouts. Based on these arguments, I state the following alternative hypothesis for the effect of 
tax uncertainty on a firm’s decision to distribute dividends: 
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H1:  Tax uncertainty reduces the probability of dividend payouts.  
The effect under H1 rests on the argument that liquidity shortfalls require costly external 
financing. Prior research suggests that a firm’s capital-market access shapes the costs of 
obtaining external funds. In this regard, financially constrained firms face difficulty in accessing 
capital markets, raising the costs of external financing (Whited and Wu 2006, Denis and Sibilkov 
2010, Edwards et al. 2016). Higher costs of external financing increase the relevance of cash-
flow uncertainty for the decision to distribute dividends, which suggests a stronger effect of tax 
uncertainty for financially constrained firms. Based on this argument, I state the following cross-
sectional hypothesis for the effect of tax uncertainty on a firm’s decision to distribute dividends: 
H1a:  The effect of tax uncertainty on the probability of dividend payouts is stronger for 
financially constrained firms.  
Given the diverse determinants of a firm’s decision to distribute dividends, the 
hypothesized effect of tax uncertainty is expected to vary according to the motives for dividend 
payouts. In this regard, institutional investors act as an external governance device and allow a 
payout policy that alleviates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Thus, for 
firms with high institutional ownership, the benefit of alleviating agency conflicts mitigates the 
costs of cash-flow uncertainty (Allen et al. 2000, Leary and Michaely 2011).6 This suggests a 
weaker effect of tax uncertainty on the probability of dividend payouts for these firms. Based on 
this argument, I state the following cross-sectional hypothesis for the effect of tax uncertainty on 
a firm’s decision to distribute dividends: 
																																								 																				
6 It remains an unresolved question in theoretical and empirical research as to whether dividend payouts and 
institutional ownership are complements or substitutes (Farre-Mensa et al. 2014). In both cases, cash-flow 
uncertainty seems less relevant for firms with high institutional ownership, as agency aspects dominate the trade-off 
between retaining and distributing after-tax cash flows.  
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H1b:  The effect of tax uncertainty on the probability of dividend payouts is weaker for firms 
with high institutional ownership.  
Tax uncertainty, through the channel of cash-flow uncertainty, might affect not only the 
decision to distribute dividends but also the amount of dividend payouts. To ensure persistent 
dividend levels over time, managers accommodate tax uncertainty by adjusting present dividend 
payouts. This adjustment avoids costly external financing and capital-market punishment (Chay 
and Suh 2009). Based on this argument, I state the following alternative hypothesis for the effect 
of tax uncertainty on dividend levels: 
H2:  Tax uncertainty reduces the amount of dividend payouts.  
The effect under H2 assumes that dividend reductions are punished by capital markets. In 
this regard, the financial life-cycle theory predicts differences in the costs of dividend reductions 
across firms (Leary and Michaely 2011). Mature firms susceptible to agency conflicts exhibit 
high costs of dividend reductions, while young and growing firms at the point of capital infusion 
are more flexible in adjusting their dividend payouts. Lower costs of dividend reductions 
diminish the relevance of cash-flow uncertainty for dividend levels, which suggests a weaker 
effect of tax uncertainty for firms at the capital-infusion stage. Based on this argument, I state the 
following cross-sectional hypothesis for the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend levels: 
H2a:  The effect of tax uncertainty on the amount of dividend payouts is weaker for firms at the 
capital-infusion stage.  
Notwithstanding these hypotheses, several arguments suggest that I might not find an 
effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts. First, Jacob et al. (2016) show that firms with high 
tax uncertainty delay large capital investments. Thus, instead of adjusting dividend payouts and 
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incurring capital-market punishment, managers might alter investments to ensure persistent 
dividend levels. Second, volatile tax payments might result from benign tax-avoidance strategies 
associated with firm-level investment (e.g., R&D tax credits, accelerated depreciation; see 
Guenther et al. 2017). This source of volatility in tax payments might not affect dividend payouts 
beyond operating uncertainty. Third, tax uncertainty might be immaterial as compared to 
operating uncertainty. If operating uncertainty is the main driver of cash-flow uncertainty, I 
might not find large-sample evidence for an effect of tax uncertainty. Based on these arguments, 
I contend that the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts is an empirical question.  
3.  Data and Research Design 
3.1.  Sample Selection 
I obtain a sample of firm-year observations for fiscal years 1993-2014 with data available 
in COMPUSTAT Industrial. To ensure consistent accounting rules for income taxes, I start in 
1993 as ASC 740 (formerly SFAS No. 109), which changed the accounting for income taxes, 
became effective for fiscal years starting after December 15, 1992.7 As the measure for tax 
uncertainty and some control variables require five prior years of data, the sample effectively 
covers fiscal years 1998-2014. I drop non-U.S. firms to avoid effects of differences in legal 
systems and financial reporting standards. I also eliminate financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) 
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) due to distinct financial accounting rules (McGuire et al. 
2013), tax-avoidance incentives (Hanlon et al. 2017), and dividend payout patterns in these 
industries (Fama and French 2001). In addition, I drop firms with “LP” or “TRUST” in their 
																																								 																				
7 Although ASC 740 did not alter the calculation of cash taxes paid, prior research suggests that firms strategically 
respond to tax law changes (e.g., firms engage in intertemporal income shifting; Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson 
1992, Guenther 1994, Maydew 1997). This behavior could affect ETRs as a basis for the tax-uncertainty measure.  
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name to exclude flow-through entities not subject to firm-level taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008). These 
restrictions result in 125,817 firm-years (13,526 firms).  
Further, I drop observations with dividends greater than sales, negative dividends, 
negative sales, and equity below $250,000 or total assets below $500,000 to be consistent with 
prior research (Chay and Suh 2009, Hoberg et al. 2014). I also drop observations with missing 
data to calculate the measure for tax uncertainty and several control variables.8 These restrictions 
yield a full sample of 32,730 firm-year observations (4,513 firms). To obtain a subsample of 
dividend-paying firms, I eliminate observations with zero dividend payouts. This leaves a 
subsample of 13,594 firm-years (1,822 firms). Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
3.2.  Variable Measurement  
I follow prior research (DeAngelo et al. 2006, Chay and Suh 2009, Hail, Tahoun, and 
Wang 2014, Hoberg et al. 2014) and use two measures for dividend payouts (DIV). First, to 
examine the probability of dividend payouts, DIV is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
a firm declares dividends on common stock in year t, and zero otherwise. Second, for the 
subsample of dividend-paying firms, DIV is the logarithm of dividends declared on common 
stock in year t and scaled by total assets at the end of year t (Desai and Jin 2011, Hoberg et al. 
2014).9 In additional tests, I scale dividends declared in year t by total sales in year t.  
																																								 																				
8 The measure for tax uncertainty requires five consecutive annual cash ETRs (McGuire et al. 2013, Guenther et al. 
2017). I calculate annual cash ETRs as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income less special items. To avoid 
a data truncation bias due to dropping loss firms (Henry and Sansing 2014), I follow Jacob et al. (2016) and set 
annual cash ETRs to 1 in case of a positive numerator and a negative denominator (i.e. tax payments in a loss year) 
and to 0 in case of a negative numerator and a negative denominator (i.e. tax refund in a loss year). In supplementary 
analysis, I require a positive denominator and non-missing values in each year and winsorize annual cash ETRs at 1 
and 0 (Hutchens and Rego 2015). In Section 5.1.1, results are qualitatively unchanged.  
9 I use the logarithm as the variable is positively skewed. Results are unchanged without using the logarithm.  
- 16 - 
To measure tax uncertainty (TAX_UNCERTAINTY), I calculate the coefficient of 
variation of annual cash ETRs over the five-year period t-4 to t (McGuire et al. 2013, Jacob et al. 
2016).10 This is an intuitive measure for tax uncertainty, as uncertain tax positions lead to more 
volatile tax payments over time and thus to higher TAX_UNCERTAINTY (Neuman 2016). Firms 
with persistent tax payments, in contrast, exhibit a narrow range of annual cash ETRs and lower 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY. In this regard, Guenther et al. (2017) and Hutchens and Rego (2015) 
show that measures based on annual cash ETRs capture uncertainty associated with a firm’s tax 
positions. This finding provides support for the construct validity of TAX_UNCERTAINTY. 
Several arguments suggest that a measure based on past cash ETRs is a suitable proxy for 
tax uncertainty. First, cash ETRs are affected by financial reporting incentives and tax accruals 
management to a lesser extent than ex-ante measures for tax uncertainty (e.g., UTBs; Robinson 
et al. 2015). Second, cash ETRs capture tax-avoidance strategies that result in cash savings 
(Dyreng et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2016) as well as in unexpected tax payments. Third, a cash-
based measure provides a more direct conceptual link to dividend payouts than income-based 
measures (e.g., GAAP ETRs). Fourth, volatility in past cash ETRs predicts future tax uncertainty 
(Drake et al. 2017), which enables managers to form expectations about tax uncertainty and to 
incorporate this information in a dividend-payout decision. Fifth, a long-run measure alleviates 
concerns that managerial decisions correlated with dividend payouts (e.g., investment) might 
affect the tax-uncertainty measure (Klassen and Laplante 2012).  
I follow Dyreng et al. (2008) and calculate long-run cash ETRs (CASH_ETR) to measure 
the level of tax avoidance. I multiply CASH_ETR by negative one so that larger values represent 
																																								 																				
10 In comparison to cash ETR volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of annual cash ETRs), the coefficient of variation 
is normalized by the underlying mean cash ETR and thus unaffected by the level of tax avoidance. Results are 
qualitatively unchanged when using cash ETR volatility as a measure for tax uncertainty. 
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(1) 
higher levels of tax avoidance. CASH_ETR and TAX_UNCERTAINTY segregate (i) the level and 
(ii) the uncertainty of tax payments as the two dimensions of a firm’s tax avoidance strategy.  
3.3.  Research Design 
To test my hypotheses, I estimate the following firm-level regression:  
 𝐷𝐼𝑉!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑌!"!!;! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑇𝑅!"!!;! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!" +𝛽!𝑆𝐷_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!"!!;! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝑇𝐵!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!"!!;! +𝛽!𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻!" +  𝛽!𝑅𝐸_𝑇𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝐴𝐺𝐸!" + 𝛽!!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" +𝛽!"𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸!" +  𝛽!"𝑁𝑂𝐿!" + 𝛽!"𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!"𝑆𝐺𝐴!" + 𝛽!"𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺!" +𝛽!"𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌!" + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀!" 
I estimate logit regressions to examine the probability of dividend payouts and OLS 
regressions to investigate dividend levels.11 The dependent variable, DIV, is one of the two 
measures for dividend payouts. 𝛽! is the coefficient of interest and captures the incremental 
effect of TAX_UNCERTAINTY on a firm’s decision to distribute dividends (H1) and the amount 
of dividend payouts (H2). Consistent with H1 and H2, I expect 𝛽! < 0  in both specifications. I 
include CASH_ETR to control for the level of tax avoidance.  
In addition to measures for tax uncertainty and the level of tax avoidance, I include 
several variables to control for determinants of dividend payouts. First, I add net operating cash 
flows adjusted for cash taxes paid in year t over total assets in year t-1 (CASH_FLOW) to control 
for the availability of internal funds.12 Firms with sufficient internal funds have a larger 
distribution potential (Fama and French 2001). Second, I add the volatility of CASH_FLOW over 
the five-year period t-4 to t (SD_CASH_FLOW) to control for cash-flow uncertainty induced by 
																																								 																				
11 In line with prior research (Chay and Suh 2009, Hoberg et al. 2014), I use a set of determinants for tests that 
examine (i) a firm’s decision to distribute dividends as well as (ii) the amount of dividend payouts.  
12 I adjust net operating cash flows for cash taxes paid. Thus, SD_CASH_FLOW captures volatility in after-tax cash 
flows that is unaffected by volatility in tax payments.  
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operating uncertainty. Firms with volatile cash flows exhibit lower dividend payouts (Chay and 
Suh 2009).13  
Third, I control for a firm’s investment opportunities. To this end, I include CASH as cash 
holdings scaled by total assets in year t, MTB as the market-to-book ratio in year t (Desai and Jin 
2011), SALES_GROWTH as the three-year sales growth from year t-2 to year t (Jacob and Jacob 
2013), and ASSET_GROWTH as the growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t (Hoberg et al. 
2014). Firms with sizeable investment opportunities require more cash, which reduces the 
distribution potential (Fama and French 2001, DeAngelo et al. 2006).14 Fourth, I control for the 
financial life-cycle theory of dividend payouts. To this end, I include RE_TE as retained earnings 
divided by shareholder equity in year t (DeAngelo et al. 2006), AGE as the logarithm of firm age 
in year t (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), and SIZE as the logarithm of total assets in year t.  
Fifth, I include LEVERAGE as long-term debt divided by total assets in year t to capture 
agency aspects of dividend payouts. Creditors mitigate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders reducing the need of dividend payouts (Jensen 1986). Sixth, I control for benign 
tax-avoidance strategies that might affect dividend payouts without inducing uncertainty in a 
firm’s tax positions (Guenther et al. 2017). To this end, I include NOL as the amount of tax loss 
carry forward, R&D as research and development expense, SGA as selling, general, and 
administrative expense, ADVERTISING as advertising expense, and CAP_INTENSITY as capital 
intensity (Graham and Tucker 2006, Neuman et al. 2016). I measure all variables in year t scaled 
																																								 																				
13 Further, SD_CASH_FLOW captures economic uncertainty as a dimension of tax uncertainty that does not result in 
volatile tax payments but contributes to volatility in operating cash flows (Neuman, Omer, and Schmidt 2016). In 
supplementary analyses, I show that the effect of TAX_UNCERTAINTY is independent from cash-flow uncertainty 
induced by operating uncertainty (see Section 5.3).  
14 The relation between cash holdings and dividend payouts is unclear. Firms hold cash for investment purposes and 
precautionary reasons (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009), which predicts a negative effect on dividend payouts. Agency 
aspects, in contrast, suggest that firms with high cash holdings distribute more dividends (Easterbrook 1984).  
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by total assets in year t-1. Finally, I include year and industry-fixed effects to account for year 
shocks and time-invariant industry characteristics.15 
Unless indicated otherwise, I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers. I estimate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firm to account for serial correlation in the data (Petersen 2009). To facilitate a 
meaningful comparison of variables, I standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions.  
4.  Results 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Columns 1-6 show statistics for the full sample and 
columns 7 and 8 for dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms, respectively. 41.5 percent 
of the firm-years in the full sample concern dividend payouts, which amount to 2.7 percent of 
total assets for the average dividend-paying firm (column 7). The mean of TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
is 0.64 and lies between the values reported in McGuire et al. (2013) and Jacob et al. (2016). 
Mean CASH_ETR is 28.4 percent and in line with prior research (Guenther et al. 2017).  
The remaining determinants are of reasonable magnitude. Firms that distribute dividends 
have lower cash-flow uncertainty induced by operating uncertainty (SD_CASH_FLOW), lower 
cash holdings (CASH), lower sales (SALES_GROWTH) and asset growth (ASSET_GROWTH), a 
lower amount of tax loss carry forward (NOL), lower research and development expense (R&D), 
and lower selling, general, and administrative expense (SGA, all p < 0.01). In contrast, dividend-
paying firms have larger cash flows (CASH_FLOW), a higher market-to-book ratio (MTB), more 
																																								 																				
15 Industry-fixed effects are based on the Fama and French 17 industry classification, available on Kenneth French’s 
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_17_ind_port.html).  
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retained earnings (RE_TE), more long-term debt (LEVERAGE), a higher capital intensity 
(CAP_INTENSITY), and are older (AGE) and larger in size (SIZE). The subsamples, however, do 
not differ in the level of tax avoidance (CASH_ETR, p = 0.73) and advertising expense 
(ADVERTISING, p = 0.52). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 presents univariate correlations. DIV is negatively correlated with 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY (p < 0.01). Further, DIV is negatively associated with SD_CASH_FLOW, 
CASH, SALES_GROWTH, ASSET_GROWTH, NOL, R&D, and SGA and positively related to 
CASH_FLOW, MTB, RE_TE, AGE, SIZE, LEVERAGE, and CAP_INTENSITY (all p < 0.01). 
These correlations are generally consistent with prior research (Hoberg et al. 2014). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
4.2.  Tax Uncertainty and the Probability of Dividend Payouts  
H1 predicts that tax uncertainty reduces the probability of dividend payouts. Table 4 
presents results for logit regressions based on Equation (1) that examine the effect of tax 
uncertainty on a firm’s decision to distribute dividends. Both specifications include the full 
sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. In column 1, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01). This result suggests that tax 
uncertainty negatively affects the likelihood of dividend payouts, which is consistent with H1. In 
column 3, including the set of determinants yields qualitatively similar results.  
With respect to the remaining determinants, I find that the probability of dividend 
payouts decreases with cash-flow uncertainty induced by operating uncertainty 
(SD_CASH_FLOW), sales (SALES_GROWTH) and asset growth (ASSET_GROWTH), long-term 
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debt (LEVERAGE), the amount of tax loss carry forward (NOL), and research and development 
expense (R&D). In contrast, the probability of dividend payouts is positively related to cash 
flows (CASH_FLOW), retained earnings (RE_TE), the market-to-book-ratio (MTB), capital 
intensity (CAP_INTENSITY), and firm age (AGE) and size (SIZE, all p < 0.01). These results are 
fairly in line with prior research (DeAngelo et al. 2006, Hoberg et al. 2014).  
I present marginal effects to assess the economic significance of these results. In 
column 4, the marginal effect of TAX_UNCERTAINTY indicates that a one standard deviation 
higher tax uncertainty reduces the probability of dividend payouts by 9.9 percentage points. 
Given the unconditional probability of dividend payouts is 41.5 percent, this effect marks a 
decrease of 23.9 percent (9.9/41.5). This effect is comparable to non-tax determinants (e.g., 
RE_TE, CAP_INTESITY), which seems reasonable as tax payments represent a major share of 
after-tax cash flows (e.g., up to 35 percent for U.S. firms) where uncertainty is difficult to hedge. 
A likelihood ratio test indicates that including TAX_UNCERTAINTY as an independent variable 
improves the fit of the regression model (χ²= 538.89, p < 0.01). Taken together, these results 
support H1 and suggest that firms with greater tax uncertainty are less likely to distribute 
dividends. Further, tax uncertainty is an economically relevant determinant of this decision.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
4.3.  The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and Financial Constraints 
The first cross-sectional hypothesis predicts that the effect of tax uncertainty on the 
probability of dividend payouts is stronger for financially-constrained firms. To test H1a, I form 
two subsamples based on whether a firm exhibits financial constraints. I classify a firm without 
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an S&P Issuer Credit Rating as financially constrained (CONSTRAINTS=1).16 Unrated firms 
lack access to public debt markets (Faulkender and Petersen 2006) and are more opaque than 
rated firms (Whited 1992). This raises the costs of obtaining external funds and leads to financial 
constraints. For each subsample, I estimate logit regressions based on Equation (1).17 
Table 5, columns 1-2 present results for firms with CONSTRAINTS=0 and columns 3-4 
results for firms with CONSTRAINTS=1. For both subsamples, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01). However, I test and find that the 
coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 3 is larger than in column 1 (p = 0.01).18 Taken 
together, these results support H1a and suggest that tax uncertainty is more relevant for dividend 
payouts of financially constrained firms. Furthermore, these tests provide evidence that tax 
uncertainty affects dividend payouts through the channel of cash-flow uncertainty.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
4.4.  The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and Institutional Ownership 
The second cross-sectional hypothesis predicts that the effect of tax uncertainty on the 
probability of dividend payouts is weaker for firms with high institutional ownership. To test this 
prediction, I form two subsamples based on the proportion of a firm’s shares held by institutional 
investors. I obtain ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings 
																																								 																				
16 Results are qualitatively unchanged if I classify a firm without a credit rating or with a non-investment grade 
credit rating (i.e. below BBB-) as financially constrained.  
17 Other measures for financial constraints are indices based on firm characteristics (see Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 
2016). As these indices include either an indicator variable for dividend payouts (e.g., Kaplan-Zingales-Index or 
Whited-Wu-Index) or firm characteristics that are highly correlated with dividend payouts (e.g., firm age and size; 
Hadlock-Pierce-Index), I do not apply these measures in my setting.  
18 Comparing coefficients of logit regressions could lead to biased inferences if the residual variance differs between 
subsamples (Allison 1999). To this end, I use a fully-interacted model and interact all independent variables with an 
indicator variable that identifies the two subsamples (CONSTRAINTS). I test whether the coefficient on the 
interaction term TAX_UNCERTAINTY#CONSTRAINTS is different from zero. This approach allows coefficients on 
independent variables to differ in each subsample and accounts for heteroscedasticity.  
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Database, which reduces the sample size to 22,169 firm-years. I classify a firm with institutional 
ownership above the annual median as having high institutional ownership (HIGH_INST=1). For 
each subsample, I estimate logit regressions based on Equation (1).  
Table 6, columns 1-2 present results for firms with HIGH_INST=0 and columns 3-4 
results for firms with HIGH_INST=1. For both subsamples, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01). However, I test and find that the 
coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 3 is smaller than in column 1 (p < 0.01). Taken 
together, these results support H1b and suggest that tax uncertainty is less relevant for firms that 
distribute dividends based on agency aspects. As the effect of tax uncertainty varies with motives 
for dividend payouts, managers seemingly consider tax uncertainty in a dividend-payout decision.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
4.5.  Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Levels  
H2 predicts that tax uncertainty negatively affects dividend levels. Table 7 shows results 
for OLS regressions based on Equation (1) that examine the effect of tax uncertainty on the 
amount of dividend payouts. All three specifications include the subsample of dividend-paying 
firms. In column 1, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01), 
which is consistent with H2. In column 2, including the set of determinants yields similar results. 
To rule out the possibility that the scalar for dividend payouts affects my results, I re-estimate 
Equation (1) and scale dividend payouts by total sales. In column 3, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY remains negative and significant (p < 0.01).  
Results for remaining determinants are in line with the previous tests. Dividend payouts 
decrease with sales (SALES_GROWTH, p < 0.01) and asset growth (ASSET_GROWTH, p < 0.01), 
- 24 - 
long-term debt (LEVERAGE, p < 0.01), and the amount of tax loss carry forward (NOL, 
p = 0.07), while dividend levels increase with cash flows (CASH_FLOW, p < 0.01), cash 
holdings (CASH, p < 0.01), the market-to-book ratio (MTB, p < 0.01), firm age (AGE, p < 0.01), 
advertising expense (ADVERTISING, p = 0.03), and capital intensity (CAP_INTENSITY, 
p < 0.01). In contrast to Table 4 but consistent with Hoberg et al. (2014), dividend levels 
decrease with firm size (SIZE, p < 0.01) and retained earnings (RE_TE, p = 0.05). 
In column 2, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY indicates that a one standard 
deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces the amount of dividend payouts by 10 percent.19 For the 
average dividend-paying firm, this effect leads to a $23.6 million reduction in dividend payouts. 
Consistent with the previous tests, the effect of TAX_UNCERTAINTY is again comparable to 
non-tax determinants (e.g., SALES_GROWTH, SIZE). An incremental f-test indicates that adding 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY as an independent variable improves the fit of the regression model 
(F = 38.45, p < 0.01). Taken together, these results support H2 and suggest that firms with 
greater tax uncertainty exhibit a lower amount of dividend payouts. Furthermore, tax uncertainty 
is an economically important determinant of observable dividend levels. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
4.6.  The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and a Firm’s Life-Cycle Stage 
The third cross-sectional hypothesis predicts that the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend 
levels is weaker for firms at the capital-infusion stage. DeAngelo et al. (2006) show that young 
and growing firms at the capital-infusion stage have lower retained earnings than more mature 
firms. Therefore, I form two subsamples based on the ratio of retained earnings to shareholder 
																																								 																				
19 e-0.105 – 1 = -10.0%.  
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equity and classify an observation with a ratio below the annual median as a firm at the capital-
infusion stage (GROWING=1). For each subsample, I estimate OLS regressions based on 
Equation (1). 
Table 8, column 1 presents results for firms with GROWING=0 and column 2 results for 
firms with GROWING=1. I find a negative and significant coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
(p < 0.01) for both subsamples. However, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 2 is 
smaller than in column 1 (p = 0.03).20 Taken together, these results support H2a and suggest that 
tax uncertainty is less relevant for dividend levels of firms at the capital-infusion stage. Thus, the 
effect of tax uncertainty on the amount of dividend payouts varies with the costs of dividend 
reductions.  
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
5.  Robustness Tests and Supplementary Analyses 
5.1.  Robustness Tests  
5.1.1.  Alternative Measures for Tax Uncertainty and Endogeneity Concerns 
I conduct several tests to assess whether my baseline results are sensitive to the chosen 
measure for tax uncertainty. Table 9, Panel A (B) shows results for dividend-paying and non-
dividend paying firms (for dividend-paying firms).21 First, I examine the sample selection 
associated with TAX_UNCERTAINTY. In line with Guenther et al. (2017), I require five 
consecutive years of positive pre-tax book income to calculate annual cash ETRs. Although 
limiting the sample to profitable firms (Henry and Sansing 2014), the coefficient on 
																																								 																				
20 I use a Chow (1960) test to assess whether OLS coefficients differ between subsamples.  
21 The sensitivity analyses in this section result in slightly different samples, which alters the number of observations 
for each test. For brevity, I report marginal effects instead of logit coefficients in Tables 9-10 and Tables 13-14. 
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TAX_UNCERTAINTY2 in column 1 is negative and significant (p < 0.01). This suggests that loss 
firms do not drive my results.  
Second, I assess whether winsorizing annual cash ETRs at 1 and 0 might affect my 
results. To this end, I calculate CV_TAX_ASSETS as the coefficient of variation of the ratio of 
cash taxes paid divided by total assets over the five-year period t-4 to t. In contrast to 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY, I do not winsorize annual ratios to exploit the undistorted distribution of 
tax payments. Consistent with my baseline results, the coefficient on CV_TAX_ASSETS in 
column 2 is negative and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, restricting annual cash ETRs to 1 and 0 
does not alter my results.  
Third, I test whether my results also hold for more extreme forms of tax uncertainty. In 
line with the hazard view of tax uncertainty, Saavedra (2017) shows that firms with large tax 
payments (i.e. less successful tax avoiders) exhibit greater tax uncertainty and a higher 
probability of unexpected tax payments in the future. I follow Saavedra (2017) and classify less 
successful tax avoiders (LSTA) as firms with an annual cash ETR and an average annual cash 
ETR larger than 0.6 in any of the years t-4 to t. In column 3, the coefficient on LSTA is negative 
and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, my findings tend to hold for a somewhat narrower measure for 
tax uncertainty. 
Fourth, I assess whether benign tax-avoidance strategies might affect my measure for tax 
uncertainty. These strategies induce volatility in tax payments that is known to managers or that 
stems from managerial decisions correlated with dividend payouts (e.g., investment). To separate 
these effects, I regress annual cash ETRs on ETR-determinants that do not induce tax 
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uncertainty.22 This captures volatility in tax payments due to past losses (NOL), tax credits for 
R&D (R&D), accelerated depreciation on tangible assets (CAPEX), and differences in statutory 
tax rates (FOROPS). I run these regressions by industry-year (based on 2-digit SIC codes) and 
measure tax uncertainty as the standard deviation of the residual 
(RESID_TAX_UNCERTAINTY).23 In a second stage, I run Equation (1) without variables from 
the first stage. In column 4, the coefficient on RESID_TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and 
significant (p < 0.01), which suggests that my results are neither driven by volatility in tax 
payments known to managers nor by managerial decisions correlated with dividend payouts.  
Fifth, I address endogeneity concerns regarding the direction of causality of my baseline 
results. Reverse causality requires a feedback effect of dividend payouts on tax uncertainty. For 
instance, firms with low dividend levels might engage in “grey area” tax avoidance that 
generates cash savings but simultaneously induces tax uncertainty. Although 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY is a long-run measure that alleviates such concerns, I provide a formal 2-
SLS instrumental variable analysis. In the first stage, I predict TAX_UNCERTAINTY using an 
OLS regression that includes an instrumental variable as well as the determinants from Equation 
(1). In the second stage, I run Equation (1) with fitted values for TAX_UNCERTAINTY obtained 
from the first-stage regression.24  
I follow Hasan et al. (2014) and use mean tax uncertainty per industry-year (excluding 
the firm’s own tax uncertainty) as an instrumental variable (AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY). This 
																																								 																				
22 In the first-stage regression, I include the amount of tax loss carry forward (NOL), research and development 
expense (R&D), capital expenditures (CAPEX), and an indicator variable for foreign operations (FOROPS). 
23 I require a minimum of 15 observations in each industry-year (see Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009). 
24 I do not include industry-fixed effects as the instrumental variable (AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY) is an industry-level 
measure (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2011).  
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variable is seemingly exogenous from the standpoint of an individual firm.25 To assess the 
validity of the instrument, I compute partial R² and partial f-statistics in the first-stage regression. 
In Panel A (B), these tests indicate that the instrument and TAX_UNCERTAINTY are highly 
correlated. Given a partial R² of 0.02 (0.02) and a partial f-statistic of 433.86 (108.25), I 
conclude that AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY is an appropriate instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
In column 5, results from the second-stage regression indicate that the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY remains negative and significant (p < 0.01 and 0.05). Taken together, 
these tests provide evidence that my baseline results are unaffected by endogeneity concerns.  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
5.1.2.  Further Robustness Tests 
I conduct several tests to provide further evidence for the robustness of my baseline 
results. Table 10, columns 1-3 and columns 4-6 present results for tests on the initial full sample 
and on the initial subsample, respectively. First, I add firm-fixed effects to alleviate concerns that 
omitted time-invariant firm characteristics might affect my results. Although firm-fixed effects 
reduce the sample size for the logit regression, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in 
column 1 is negative and significant (p < 0.01).26 In column 4, including firm-fixed effects in the 
OLS regression echoes my baseline results (p < 0.01). Next, I exclude fixed effects from the logit 
regression to address concerns raised by Greene (2004) with regard to fixed effects in nonlinear 
models. In column 2, results are in line with my baseline results (p < 0.01). For completeness, I 
exclude fixed effects from the OLS regression. Results in column 5 are unchanged (p < 0.01).  
																																								 																				
25 I calculate AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY based on 2-digit SIC codes. I require at least 15 observations in each 
industry-year to ensure that tax-avoidance strategies of individual firms do not drive industry-level tax uncertainty. 
26 Firm-fixed effects require within-firm variation in dividend payouts. Therefore, I drop firms that neither initiate 
nor omit dividend payouts during the sample period, which reduces the full sample to 9,991 firm-years.  
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Finally, I add alternative control variables for cash-flow uncertainty induced by operating 
uncertainty and firm size. I substitute CASH_FLOW with return-on-assets in year t (ROA). I also 
include the standard deviation of ROA over the five-year period t-4 to t (SD_ROA) and the 
logarithm of market value of equity (LN(MV)). In columns 3 and 6, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01). Taken together, these tests suggest 
that neither time-invariant firm or industry characteristics nor a general time trend in dividend 
payouts affect my results. My inferences also hold with respect to several measures for tax 
uncertainty as well as alternative control variables.  
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
5.2.  Tax Uncertainty and Changes in Dividend Payouts  
5.2.1.  Time-Series Tests  
The analysis thus far has been mainly cross-sectional. In this section, I conduct time-
series tests to analyze whether tax uncertainty affects changes in dividend payouts over time and 
present results in Table 11. First, I examine the decision to initiate dividends in year t if a firm 
does not distribute dividends in year t-1. The coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 1 is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01). In column 2, marginal effects indicate that a one standard 
deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces the probability of dividend initiations by 0.4 percentage 
points. As the unconditional probability of dividend initiations is 4.5 percent, this effect marks a 
decrease of 8.9 percent (0.4/4.5). In line with prior research (Hoberg et al. 2014), dividend-
initiating firms have higher cash flows, more retained earnings, and are older and larger in size.  
Second, I analyze the decision to omit dividends in year t if a firm distributes dividends 
in year t-1. In contrast to dividend initiations, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 
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3 is positive and significant (p < 0.01). In column 4, marginal effects show that a one standard 
deviation higher tax uncertainty increases the probability of dividend omissions by 
0.8 percentage points. As the unconditional probability of omitting dividends is 4.3 percent, this 
effect marks an increase of 18.6 percent (0.8/4.3). Remaining determinates have opposite signs 
as in column 1. Thus, young and growing firms with high cash-flow uncertainty omit dividends. 
Finally, I examine the decision to increase (decrease) dividends in year t if a firm 
distributes dividends in year t-1. For dividend increases, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
in column 5 is negative and significant (p < 0.01). In column 6, marginal effects indicate that a 
one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces the probability of dividend increases by 
6.1 percentage points. Given an unconditional probability of dividend increases of 53.6 percent, 
this indicates a decrease of 11.4 percent (6.1/53.6). For dividend decreases, the coefficient on 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 7 is positive but insignificant (p = 0.26). Taken together, these 
tests corroborate my baseline results and suggest that tax uncertainty affects changes in dividend 
payouts. Firms with greater tax uncertainty are less (more) likely to initiate and to increase (omit) 
dividend payouts.  
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
5.2.2. Tax Uncertainty and the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut  
To provide further evidence for the effect of tax uncertainty on changes in dividend 
payouts over time, I examine the dividend tax cut instigated by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003. This reform reduced the investor-level tax on individual dividend 
income providing an exogenous shock to a firm’s payout policy (Chetty and Saez 2005). In line 
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with the theoretical arguments above and the results derived thus far, I expect that firms with 
high tax uncertainty reacted less strongly to the reform than firms with low tax uncertainty.  
I conduct two tests to examine this expectation and present results in Table 12. For two 
samples of firms with non-missing data, I compare dividend payouts in a three-year period prior 
to the dividend tax cut with those in a three-year period after the reform (fiscal years 1999-2001 
and 2004-2006).27 I modify Equation (1) and include indicator variables for the post-period 
(POST) and for firms with high tax uncertainty (HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY). I classify a firm 
with tax uncertainty above the annual median in the pre-period as having high tax uncertainty. 
To achieve a difference-in-differences design, I interact POST with HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY. 
First, I analyze changes in the probability of dividend payouts for firms that do not 
distribute dividends in the fiscal year 1998. In column 1, the coefficient on POST is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01). Consistent with Chetty and Saez (2005), this result suggests that the 
probability of dividend payouts for initially non-dividend-paying firms increased after the reform. 
The coefficient on HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY#POST, however, is negative and significant 
(p = 0.03). This result is consistent with the expectation that firms with high tax uncertainty 
reacted less strongly to the dividend tax cut.  
Second, I examine whether dividend-paying firms altered the amount of dividend payouts 
in response to the reform. In column 3, the coefficient on POST is positive and significant 
(p = 0.02). Thus, dividend-paying firms increased their dividend levels after the reform. In 
contrast, the coefficient on HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY#POST is again negative and significant 
(p = 0.03). This result suggests that firms with high tax uncertainty increased their dividend 
																																								 																				
27 I do not include fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to exclude strategic responses of firms to the dividend tax cut and to 
rule out the possibility that fiscal years deviating from the calendar year might affect my results.  
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payouts less strongly than firms with low tax uncertainty. In untabulated tests, I repeat these 
analyses and use propensity score matching to account for potential endogeneity in identifying 
firms with high tax uncertainty.28 Although reducing the sample sizes, inferences are unchanged.  
Overall, these tests provide further evidence that tax uncertainty not only affects the 
probability and the amount of dividend payouts but also accounts for changes in dividend 
payouts over time. What is more, tax uncertainty moderates the effect of exogenous shocks (e.g., 
tax reforms) on a firm’s payout policy.  
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
5.3.  The Relation between Tax Uncertainty and Operating Uncertainty 
Thus far, I have treated cash-flow uncertainty induced by operating uncertainty as a 
determinant of dividend payouts. In this section, I examine whether the effect of tax uncertainty 
on dividend payouts is independent from a firm’s operating uncertainty to rule out the possibility 
that a spurious correlation between these two dimensions might drive my results (Jacob et al. 
2016). To this end, I sort observations into annual quartiles of SD_CASH_FLOW and estimate 
Equation (1) for each quartile. Table 13, Panel A (B) presents results for the full sample of 
dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms (for the subsample of dividend-paying firms).  
Results indicate that tax uncertainty has a consistent negative effect on dividend payouts. 
The coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant in seven out of eight 
specifications (p < 0.01) and does not increase across quartiles of operating uncertainty. In both 
Panels, the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts is similar for firms with low (column 1) 
																																								 																				
28 Propensity score matching entails constructing a control group (HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY=0) that is similar to 
the treatment group (HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY=1). For both samples, I conduct a one-to-one nearest neighbor 
matching without replacement based on all determinants in Equation (1). Hotellings T² tests, which jointly consider 
all determinants, suggest that subsamples for both tests do not differ from each other (p = 0.95 and 0.98).  
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and high operating uncertainty (column 4). Taken together, these results suggest that operating 
uncertainty does not drive the relation between tax uncertainty and dividend payouts. Thus, tax 
uncertainty is a dimension of overall firm risk that has distinct effects on dividend payouts.  
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
5.4. The Relation between Tax Uncertainty and the Level of Tax Payments 
DeSimone et al. (2016), Guenther et al. (2017), and Saavedra (2017) find that firms might 
achieve low levels of tax payments (i.e. high tax avoidance) without experiencing an increase in 
tax uncertainty. Therefore, I examine whether the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts 
varies with the level of tax avoidance. I follow the analysis in the previous section and estimate 
Equation (1) by quartiles of CASH_ETR. Table 14, Panel A (B) shows results for the full sample 
of dividend-paying and non-dividend paying firms (for the subsample of dividend-paying firms).  
In both Panels, results indicate that the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts 
varies with the level of tax avoidance. In column 1, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY is 
insignificant for the highest level of tax avoidance (p = 0.25 and 0.50) but negative and 
significant for less tax avoidance (i.e. for higher tax payments and cash ETRs; all p < 0.01). 
Overall, these results suggest that the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts does not 
increase with the level of tax avoidance. Thus, both dimensions of a firm’s tax-avoidance 
strategy have distinct effects on dividend payouts where proxies for the level of tax avoidance do 
not capture underlying tax uncertainty. 
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE 
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5.5.  Tax Uncertainty and Share Repurchases 
Share repurchases have become an increasingly important distribution channel for U.S. 
firms (Skinner 2008). As firms might repurchase shares without creating expectations among 
investors, share repurchases are more flexible than dividend payouts. This suggests that the costs 
for adjusting share repurchases are lower than for dividend payouts (Jagannathan et al. 2000). 
Therefore, I expect a negative but weaker effect of tax uncertainty on both the probability and 
the level of share repurchases. To test this expectation, I collect a full sample of repurchasing and 
non-repurchasing firms and a subsample of repurchasing firms. I estimate a logit regression 
based on Equation (1) to examine the probability of share repurchases and an OLS regression for 
the amount of share repurchases.  
Table 15, columns 1-2 (column 3) show results for the full sample (for the subsample). In 
column 1, the coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant (p < 0.01). 
Marginal effects in column 2 indicate that a one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty 
reduces the probability of share repurchases by 4.8 percentage points. As the unconditional 
probability of share repurchases is 55.5 percent, this effect marks a decrease of 8.6 percent 
(4.8/55.5). The coefficient on TAX_UNCERTAINTY in column 3 is also negative and significant. 
A one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty reduces the amount of share repurchases by 8 
percent. For the average share-repurchasing firm, this effect results in a $22.5 million reduction 
in share repurchases. Results for remaining determinants are fairly consistent with prior research 
(Hoberg et al. 2014). Overall, these results suggest that tax uncertainty affects a firm’s decision 
to repurchase shares and their amount. In line with the argument that share repurchases are more 
flexible, the effect of tax uncertainty on share repurchases is weaker than on dividend payouts.  
INSERT TABLE 15 HERE 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this study, I investigate whether and to what extent tax uncertainty affects both a firm’s 
decision to distribute dividends and their amount. Tax uncertainty contributes to overall cash-
flow uncertainty and impairs the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash flows available 
for distribution. Based on this argument, I predict and find that tax uncertainty is negatively 
related to the probability of dividend payouts. This effect is stronger in the presence of financial 
constraints and weaker for firms that prioritize agency aspects of dividend payouts. In addition, I 
show that tax uncertainty reduces the amount of dividend payouts. Due to low costs of dividend 
reductions, this effect is weaker for young and growing firms at the capital-infusion stage.  
The effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts is economically meaningful. A one 
standard deviation higher tax uncertainty results in a 9.9 percentage point lower probability and a 
$23.6 million reduction in dividend payouts. Supplementary tests suggest that tax uncertainty 
also contributes to changes in dividend payouts over time and moderates the effect of tax reforms 
(e.g., of the 2003 dividend tax cut) on a firm’s payout policy. Thus, tax uncertainty is a relevant 
determinant of the decision to distribute dividends and of observable dividend levels. 
Taken together, my findings increase our understanding of the likely effects of uncertain 
tax avoidance on a firm’s financial ecosystem. First, the negative effect of tax uncertainty on 
dividend payouts constitutes a real effect of tax avoidance and suggests that uncertain tax 
avoidance induces non-tax costs on shareholders. This might distort investment decisions of 
investors and shareholders that select firms based on their payout policies. Second, my findings 
indicate that analyses of real effects of tax avoidance require separate tests for the level and the 
uncertainty of tax payments to identify the relevant driver. Third, I document that tax uncertainty 
affects dividend payouts over and above cash-flow uncertainty induced by operating uncertainty 
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(Chay and Suh 2009, Hoberg et al. 2014). This finding should interest shareholders and financial 
statement users as volatile tax payments might be an indicator for lower dividend levels. Thus, 
tax-policy actions that reduce uncertainty in a firm’s tax payments (e.g., the US. Compliance 
Assurance Process; see Beck and Lisowsky 2014) are likely to stimulate dividend payouts.  
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Appendix – Variables 
Dependent Variables 
DIV First, DIV is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares 
dividends on common stock in year t (DVCt > 0), and zero otherwise 
(DVCt = 0). Second, DIV is the natural logarithm of dividends declared on 
common stock in year t (DVCt) divided by total assets in year t (ATt). I set 
negative values to zero. Alternatively, I divide DVCt by total sales in year t 
(SALEt).  
  INITIATE Indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t 
(DVCt > 0) and did not declare dividends in year t-1 (DVCt-1 = 0). The variable 
is zero if a firm declares dividends in neither year (DVCt, t-1 = 0). 
  OMIT Indicator variable with the value of one if a firm does not declare dividends in 
year t (DVCt = 0) and declared dividends in year t-1 (DVCt-1 > 0). The variable 
is zero if a firm declares dividends in both years (DVCt, t-1 > 0). 
  INCREASE Indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares higher dividends per 
share in year t than in year t-1 (DVPSP_Ft > DVPSP_Ft-1). The variable is zero 
if a firm does not increase dividends per share in year t. 
  DECREASE Indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares lower dividends per 
share in year t than in year t-1 (DVPSP_Ft < DVPSP_Ft-1). The variable is zero 
if a firm does not decrease dividends per share in year t. 
  REPU First, REPU is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm repurchases 
shares in year t, and zero otherwise. I follow Grullon and Michaely (2002) and 
compute share repurchases as purchases of common and preferred stock in 
year t (PRSTKCt) less the change in the redemption value of preferred stock in 
year t (PSTKRVt-1–PSTRKVt). Second, REPU is the natural logarithm of share 
repurchases in year t divided by total assets in year t (ATt).  
  
Measures for Tax Uncertainty  
TAX_UNCERTAINTY Coefficient of variation of annual cash ETRs over the five-year period t-4 to t. 
I calculate annual cash ETRs in year t as cash taxes paid (TXPDt) in year t 
divided by pre-tax income in year t (PIt) adjusted for special items (SPIt). I set 
missing values for SPIt to zero. I follow Jacob et al. (2016) and require non-
missing values in each year. I set annual cash ETRs to 1 in case of a positive 
numerator and a negative denominator and to 0 in case of a negative numerator 
and a negative denominator. I winsorize annual cash ETRs at 1 and 0.  
  TAX_UNCERTAINTY2 Coefficient of variation of annual cash ETRs over the five-year period t-4 to t. 
I follow Hutchens and Rego (2015) and require a positive denominator and 
non-missing values in each year. I winsorize annual cash ETRs at 1 and 0. 
  CV_TAX_ASSETS Coefficient of variation of the ratio of cash taxes paid in year t (TXPDt) 
divided by total assets in year t (ATt). I calculate CV_TAX_ASSETS over the 
five-year period t-4 to t. I drop observations with a negative numerator 
(TXPDt < 0).  
  LSTA Indicator variable with the value of one if the annual cash ETR and the average 
annual cash ETR are larger than 0.6 in any of the years t-4 to t, and zero 
otherwise. I follow Saavedra (2017) and calculate average annual cash ETRs 
as cash taxes paid in year t (TXPDt) divided by the average pre-tax income 
over the three-year period t-2 to t (PIt-2;t) adjusted for special items (SPIt-2;t). I 
require a positive denominator and non-missing values in each year.  
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RESID_TAX_UNCERTAINTY Standard deviation of the residual from a regression of annual cash ETRs on 
NOL, R&D, CAPEX, and FOROPS. I calculate the standard deviation over the 
five-year period t-4 to t. To calculate annual cash ETRs, I follow Jacob et al. 
(2016) and require non-missing values. I set annual cash ETRs to 1 in case of a 
positive numerator and a negative denominator and to 0 in case of a negative 
numerator and a negative denominator. I winsorize annual cash ETRs at 1 and 
0. NOL denotes the amount of tax loss carry forward in year t (TLCFt) divided 
by total assets in year t-1 (ATt-1). I set missing values for TLCFt to zero. R&D 
denotes the research and development expense in year t (XRDt) divided by 
total assets in year t-1 (ATt-1). I set missing values for XRDt to zero. CAPEX 
denotes capital expenditures in year t (CAPXt) divided by total assets in year t-
1 (ATt-1). FOROPS is an indicator variable with the value of one if the firm has 
non-missing values for foreign income in year t (PIFOt), and zero otherwise. I 
estimate this regression per year and 2-digit SIC code. I use the entire 
population of COMPUSTAT firms and require at least 15 observations in each 
industry-year (see Frank et al. 2009).  
 Instrumental Variable 
AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
Mean of TAX_UNCERTAINTY per industry-year excluding 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY of firm i. I calculate AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY per year 
and 2-digit SIC code. I require at least 15 observations in each industry-year.  
  
Control Variables 
CASH_ETR Long-run cash ETR as the sum of cash taxes paid over the five-year period t-4 
to t (TXPDt-4;t) divided by the sum of pre-tax income over the five-year period 
t-4 to t (PIt-4;t) adjusted for special items (SPIt-4;t). I set missing values for SPIt 
to zero. I follow Dyreng et al. (2008) and require firms to have a positive 
denominator. I winsorize CASH_ETR at 1 and 0.  
 CASH_FLOW Net operating cash flows in year t (OANCFt) adjusted for cash taxes paid in 
year t (TXPDt) and divided by total assets in year t-1 (ATt-1). 
  SD_CASH_FLOW Standard deviation of CASH_FLOW over the five-year period t-4 to t. 
  CASH Cash and short-term investments in year t (CHEt) divided by total assets in 
year t (ATt).  
  MTB Market value of equity in year t (PRCC_Ft*CSHOt) divided by the book value 
of equity in year t (CEQt).  
  SALES_GROWTH Sales in year t (SALEt) divided by sales in year t-2 (SALEt-2) less 1.  
  ASSET_GROWTH Total assets in year t (ATt) divided by total assets in year t-1 (ATt-1) less 1.  
  RE_TE Retained earnings in year t (REt) divided by shareholder equity in year t 
(SEQt)  
  AGE Natural logarithm of 1 plus firm age in year t. I follow Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) and compute firm age as year t (FYEARt) less the first year with a non-
missing stock price (PRCC_Ft) in COMPUSTAT. I set negative values to zero.  
  SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in year t (ATt). Alternatively, I measure SIZE 
as the natural logarithm of total sales in year t (SALEt). 
  LEVERAGE Long-term debt in year t (DLTTt) divided by total assets in year t (ATt).  
  NOL Amount of tax loss carry forward in year t (TLCFt) divided by total assets in 
year t-1 (ATt-1). I set missing values to zero. 
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R&D Research and development expense in year t (XRDt) divided by total assets in 
year t-1 (ATt-1). I set missing values to zero.  
  SGA Selling, general, and administrative expense in year t (XSGAt) divided by total 
assets in year t-1 (ATt-1). I set missing values to zero. 
  ADVERTISING Advertising expense in year t (XADt) divided by total assets in year t-1 (ATt-1). 
I set missing values to zero. 
  CAP_INTENSITY Property, plant and equipment in year t (PPEGTt) divided by total assets in 
year t-1 (ATt-1). 
  
Additional Control Variables 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes in year t (EBITt) divided by total assets in 
year t-1 (ATt-1).  
  SD_ROA Standard deviation of ROA over the five-year period t-4 to t.  
  LN(MV) Natural logarithm of the market value of equity in year t (PRCC_Ft*SCHOt).  
  
Partitioning Variables 
CONSTRAINTS Indicator variable with the value of one if the firm does not have a Standard & 
Poor's Issuer Credit Rating in year t (SPLTICRMt), and zero otherwise.  
  HIGH_INST Indicator variable with the value of one if the share of average institutional 
ownership in year t (INSTOWN_PERCt) is above the annual median, and zero 
otherwise. I obtain ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional 
(13f) Holdings Database.  
  GROWING Indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of retained earnings divided 
by shareholder equity in year t (RE_TE) is below the annual median, and zero 
otherwise. 
  POST Indicator variable with the value of zero for fiscal years 1999-2001 and the 
value of one for fiscal years 2004-2006.  
  HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY Indicator variable with the value of one if TAX_UNCERTAINTY is above the 
annual median in any of the fiscal years 1999-2001, and zero otherwise.  
Note: I provide COMPUSTAT variable names in parentheses. Variables collected from other sources are defined 
accordingly.   
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Table 1 
Sample Section 
Data Restrictions Firm-Years Firms 
Observations in COMPUSTAT Industrial for fiscal years 1993-2014 251,611 28,170 
Less: Observations of firms incorporated outside the United States (65,326) (7,627) 
Less: Observations of financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) (59,170) (6,872) 
Less: Observations of firms with "LP" or "TRUST" in their name (1,298) (145) 
Less: Observations with dividends greater than sales (DVCt > SALEt) (1,659) (469) 
Less: Observations with negative dividends (DVCt < 0) or negative sales 
(SALEt < 0) 
(5) – 
Less: Observations with book equity below $250,000 (CEQt < 0.25) or total 
assets below $500,000 (ATt < 0.5) 
(20,035) (615) 
Less: Observations with insufficient data to compute TAX_UNCERTAINTY (56,611) (5,951) 
Less: Observations with insufficient data to compute control variables (14,777) (1,978) 
Full Sample: Dividend-paying firms and non-dividend-paying firms 
(sample period 1998-2014) 32,730 4,513 
Less: Observations with zero dividend payouts (DVCt = 0) (19,136) (2,691) 
Subsample: Dividend-paying firms (sample period 1998-2014) 13,594 1,822 
Note: This table presents the sample selection. The full sample (subsample) includes dividend-paying and non-
dividend-paying firms (dividend-paying firms). I define variables in the Appendix.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables N Mean SD 25% Median 75% Mean DIV > 0 
Mean 
DIV = 0 
DIV 32,730 0.415 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.027 0.000 
TAX_UNCERTAINTY 32,730 0.639 0.441 0.282 0.554 0.890 0.484 0.749 
CASH_ETR 32,730 0.284 0.197 0.164 0.268 0.353 0.283 0.284 
CASH_FLOW 32,730 0.140 0.111 0.070 0.126 0.195 0.154 0.129 
SD_CASH_FLOW 32,730 0.074 0.063 0.033 0.055 0.092 0.054 0.088 
CASH 32,730 0.150 0.164 0.026 0.086 0.221 0.121 0.171 
MTB 32,730 2.684 2.640 1.188 1.915 3.151 2.995 2.469 
SALES_GROWTH 32,730 0.229 0.433 -0.011 0.149 0.363 0.164 0.277 
ASSET_GROWTH 32,730 0.110 0.261 -0.018 0.060 0.165 0.080 0.130 
RE_TE 32,730 0.348 1.086 0.144 0.528 0.828 0.750 0.031 
AGE 32,730 2.852 0.677 2.303 2.890 3.466 3.177 2.621 
SIZE 32,730 6.291 1.980 4.934 6.281 7.606 7.117 5.706 
LEVERAGE 32,730 0.165 0.163 0.003 0.132 0.271 0.176 0.157 
NOL 32,730 0.062 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.030 0.087 
R&D 32,730 0.028 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.017 0.036 
SGA 32,730 0.288 0.230 0.117 0.238 0.401 0.252 0.314 
ADVERTISING 32,730 0.013 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.013 0.013 
CAP_INTENSITY 32,730 0.559 0.407 0.242 0.457 0.784 0.640 0.502 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Columns 1-6, 7 and 8 present descriptive statistics for dividend-paying and non-
dividend-paying firms, for dividend-paying firms, and for non-dividend-paying firms. In Columns 2-6 (7-8), DIV is an indicator 
variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise (dividends declared in year t and scaled 
by total assets in year t). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. I define variables in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 3 
Correlation Table 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1)  DIV 1.00                  
(2)  TAX_UNCERTAINTY -0.30 1.00                 
(3)  CASH_ETR 0.00 -0.28 1.00                
(4)  CASH_FLOW 0.11 -0.23 -0.11 1.00               
(5)  SD_CASH_FLOW -0.25 0.22 0.07 0.08 1.00              
(6)  CASH -0.15 0.08 -0.01 0.20 0.29 1.00             
(7)  MTB 0.09 -0.12 -0.10 0.38 0.03 0.13 1.00            
(8)  SALES_GROWTH -0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.24 0.17 -0.01 0.14 1.00           
(9)  ASSET_GROWTH -0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.49 1.00          
(10)  RE_TE 0.29 -0.33 0.01 0.19 -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.03 1.00         
(11)  AGE 0.40 -0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -0.27 -0.12 0.01 -0.16 -0.10 0.19 1.00        
(12)  SIZE 0.35 -0.25 -0.14 0.06 -0.35 -0.19 0.19 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.27 1.00       
(13)  LEVERAGE 0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.16 -0.22 -0.43 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.32 1.00      
(14)  NOL -0.15 0.23 -0.07 -0.10 0.11 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.38 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 1.00     
(15)  R&D -0.18 0.14 -0.07 0.05 0.17 0.43 0.17 0.06 0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.26 0.19 1.00    
(16)  SGA -0.13 -0.01 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.13 -0.05 -0.11 -0.32 -0.29 0.07 0.25 1.00   
(17)  ADVERTISING 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.41 1.00  
(18)  CAP_INTENSITY 0.17 0.05 -0.07 0.21 -0.12 -0.30 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.23 -0.05 -0.23 -0.19 -0.01 1.00 
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. DIV is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. I define variables in the Appendix. 
Bold coefficients denote significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Tax Uncertainty and the Probability of Dividend Payouts 
  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  		
	
Coef. (SE) ME  Coef. (SE) ME  Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.752*** -0.180  -0.427*** -0.099  
 
 
(0.034)     (0.036)     CASH_ETR 
 
   0.040 0.009  
 
 
   (0.029)     CASH_FLOW 
 
   0.150*** 0.035  
 
 
   (0.035)     SD_CASH_FLOW 
 
   -0.184*** -0.042  
 
 
   (0.040)     CASH 
 
   0.003    0.001  
 
 
   (0.043)   MTB 
 
   0.157*** 0.036  
 
 
   (0.043)     SALES_GROWTH 
 
   -0.225*** -0.052  
 
 
   (0.025)     ASSET_GROWTH 
 
   -0.235*** -0.054  
 
 
   (0.023)     RE_TE 
 
   0.421*** 0.097  
 
 
   (0.056)     AGE 
 
   0.692*** 0.160  
 
 
   (0.041)     SIZE 
 
   0.568*** 0.131  
 
 
   (0.049)     LEVERAGE 
 
   -0.117*** -0.027  
 
 
   (0.040)     NOL 
 
   -0.132*** -0.031  
 
 
   (0.048)     R&D 
 
   -0.331*** -0.077  
 
 
   (0.057)     SGA 
 
   0.080 0.018  
 
 
   (0.049)     ADVERTISING 
 
   -0.040    -0.009  
 
 
   (0.041)     CAP_INTENSITY 
 
   0.341*** 0.079  
 
 
   (0.046)     Intercept 
 
-0.852***   -0.356***      (0.070)       (0.084)       
Year FE   Y   Y   
Industry FE   Y   Y   
Observations 
 
32,730  32,730  Likelihood Ratio 
 
-19,730  -15,653  Pseudo R²  0.112   0.295   
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Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the effect of tax uncertainty 
on the probability of dividend payouts for the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-
paying firms. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logit 
regression based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous 
variables at their means. All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. The dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator 
variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. All 
regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and Financial Constraints 
  
(1) (2) 	 (3) (4)    
 
Coef. (SE) ME 	 Coef. (SE) ME   Subsample 
 
CONSTRAINTS = 0  CONSTRAINTS = 1   Variables 
 
DIV  DIV   TAX_UNCERTAINTY β1 
 
-0.296*** -0.068  -0.494*** -0.093      (0.060)   (0.044)    Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y   Year FE 
 
Y  Y   Industry FE  Y  Y   Observations 
 
10,718  22,012   Likelihood Ratio 
 
-4,964  -10,490   Pseudo R²  0.313  0.246   
Equality of β1 
p-value 
 
0.010***   
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the moderating effect of 
financial constraints for the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. 
Columns 1-2 (3-4) include firms with CONSTRAINTS=0 (CONSTRAINTS=1). Columns 1 and 3 
(2 and 4) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logit regression based on Equation (1). I 
calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All variables are 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. 
The dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares 
dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed 
effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define 
variables in the Appendix. I conduct a t-test to assess the equality of coefficients between 
subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed).  
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Table 6 
The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and Institutional Ownership 
  
(1) (2) 	 (3) (4)     
 
Coef. (SE) ME 	 Coef. (SE) ME   Subsample 
 
HIGH_INST = 0  HIGH_INST = 1   Variables 
 
DIV  DIV   TAX_UNCERTAINTY β1 
 
-0.492*** -0.111  -0.266*** -0.064      (0.060)     (0.061)      Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y   Year FE 
 
Y  Y   Industry FE  Y  Y   Observations 
 
11,089  11,080   Likelihood Ratio 
 
-4,883  -5,404   Pseudo R²  0.347  0.289   Equality of β1 
p-value 
 
0.007***   
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the moderating effect of 
institutional ownership for the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. I 
obtain ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings Database. Columns 
1-2 (3-4) include firms with HIGH_INST=0 (HIGH_INST=1). Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report 
coefficients (marginal effects) for a logit regression based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal 
effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All variables are standardized to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. The dependent variable, 
DIV, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero 
otherwise. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. I report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the 
Appendix. I conduct a t-test to assess the equality of coefficients between subsamples. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 7 
Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Levels 
  
(1)  (2)  (3) 		
	
Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.174***     -0.105***     -0.092*** 
  
(0.020)    (0.017)    (0.021)   CASH_ETR 
 
  0.009  0.043** 
    
(0.015)    (0.018)   CASH_FLOW 
 
  0.214***  0.179*** 
    
(0.018)    (0.021)   SD_CASH_FLOW 
 
  -0.007  -0.084*** 
    
(0.017)    (0.021)   CASH 
 
  0.129***  0.205*** 
    
(0.019)    (0.022)   MTB 
 
  0.256***  0.264*** 
    
(0.018)    (0.022)   SALES_GROWTH 
 
  -0.104***  -0.154*** 
    
(0.011)    (0.014)   ASSET_GROWTH 
 
  -0.179***  -0.087*** 
    
(0.010)    (0.013)   RE_TE 
 
  -0.034**  -0.044** 
    
(0.017)    (0.020)   AGE 
 
  0.096***  0.118*** 
    
(0.019)    (0.022)   SIZE 
 
  -0.130***  -0.234*** 
    
(0.024)    (0.029)   LEVERAGE 
 
  -0.130***  -0.014    
    
(0.020)    (0.025)   NOL 
 
  -0.030*  -0.034* 
    
(0.016)    (0.019)   R&D 
 
  0.027  0.115*** 
    
(0.021)    (0.025)   SGA 
 
  0.017  -0.285*** 
    
(0.023)    (0.027)   ADVERTISING 
 
  0.038**  0.111*** 
    
(0.017)    (0.019)   CAP_INTENSITY 
 
  0.109***  0.110*** 
    
(0.024)    (0.030)   Intercept 
 
-4.272***  -4.236***  -4.195***    (0.053)     (0.047)     (0.054)   
Year FE 
 
Y  Y  Y Industry FE  Y   Y   Y 
Observations 
 
13,594  13,594  13,594 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-19,090  -16,802  -18,602 Adjusted R²  0.089   0.349   0.318 
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Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the effect of tax 
uncertainty on dividend levels for the subsample of dividend-paying firms. All columns 
report coefficients for an OLS regression based on Equation (1). All variables are 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting 
regressions. In columns 1-2 (3), the dependent variable, DIV, is the natural logarithm of 
dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in year t (the natural logarithm of 
dividends in year t and scaled by total sales in year t). In columns 1-2 (3), SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in year t (the natural logarithm of total sales in year t). 
All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. I report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define 
variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 8 
The Effect of Tax Uncertainty and a Firm’s Life-Cycle Stage 
  
(1)  (2) 		
 
Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Subsample 
 
GROWING = 0  GROWING = 1 Variables 
 
DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY β1 
 
-0.155***  -0.085***    (0.027)    (0.021)   Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y Year FE 
 
Y  Y Industry FE  Y  Y Observations 
 
6,793  6,801 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-7,691  -8,825 Adjusted R²  0.334  0.364 Equality of β1 
p-value 
 
0.030** 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the moderating effect 
of a firm’s life-cycle stage for the subsample of dividend-paying firms. Column 1 (2) 
includes firms with GROWING=0 (GROWING=1). All columns report coefficients for 
an OLS regression based on Equation (1). All variables are standardized to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. The dependent 
variable, DIV, is the natural logarithm of dividends in year t and scaled by total assets 
in year t. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. I report 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define 
variables in the Appendix. I conduct a Chow (1960) test to assess the equality of 
coefficients between subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 9 
Alternative Measures for Tax Uncertainty and Endogeneity Concerns 
Panel A: Tax Uncertainty and the Probability of Dividend Payouts 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
 
ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE) Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY2 
 
-0.052*** 
         
 
(0.042)   
        CV_TAX_ASSETS 
   
-0.073*** 
       
   
(0.036)   
      LSTA 
     
-0.026*** 
          
(0.037)   
    RESID_TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
     
-0.081*** 
  
       
(0.033)   
  TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
       
 
 
-0.201*** 
                   (0.024) 
First-Stage Regression:           
IV: AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY        0.121*** 
                    (0.006)   
Partial R²          0.017 
Partial f-Statistic                   433.860 
Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Year FE 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Industry FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  N Observations 
 
18,951  26,414  18,466  31,306  29,559 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-9,651  -12,555  -9,562  -15,392  - Pseudo R²  0.263  0.305  0.247  0.276  0.269 
 
  
- 57 - 
Panel B: Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Levels 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 		
	
Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY2 
 
-0.065***         
 
 
(0.019)           CV_TAX_ASSETS 
 
  -0.045***       
 
 
  (0.017)         LSTA 
 
    -0.063***     
 
 
    (0.014)       RESID_TAX_UNCERTAINTY      -0.048***   
        
(0.016)     TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
        -0.199** 
                   (0.100)   
First-Stage Regression:           
IV: AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY        0.111***                     (0.011)   
Partial R²          0.013 
Partial f-Statistic                   108.250 
Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Industry FE   Y  Y  Y  Y  N 
Observations 
 
10,134  11,384  10,175  13,077  9,659 Likelihood Ratio -11,994  -13,821  -12,020  -16,369  - Adjusted R²   0.370  0.355  0.374  0.325  0.318 
Note: This table presents regression results for robustness tests with alternative measures for tax uncertainty. Panel A 
(B) includes samples of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms (subsamples of dividend-paying firms). 
Panel A (B), columns 1-4 report marginal effects for a logit regression (coefficients for an OLS regression) based on 
Equation (1). Panels A and B, column 5 reports results for a 2-SLS-model. In a first stage, I estimate Equation (1) 
with TAX_UNCERTAINTY as a dependent variable and AV_TAX_UNCERTAINTY as an instrumental variable. In a 
second stage, I estimate Equation (1) with predicted values for TAX_UNCERTAINTY obtained from the first-stage 
regression. I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All variables are 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. In Panel A (B), the 
dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero 
otherwise (the natural logarithm of dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in year t). Regressions in columns 1-4 
(5) are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects (year-fixed effects). I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 10 
Further Robustness Tests 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) 		
 
ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE)   Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV   DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.166***  -0.099***  -0.083***    -0.086***  -0.109***  -0.080*** 
	  
(0.051)  (0.035)    (0.036)      (0.013)    (0.017)    (0.018)   ROA 
     
0.044***        0.275*** 
      
(0.040)          (0.020)   SD_ROA 
     
-0.054***        0.015    
      
(0.043)          (0.016)   LN(MV) 
     
0.144***        -0.058**            (0.050)               (0.023)   
Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y  Y   Y  Y  Y Year FE 
 
Y  N  Y   Y  N  Y Industry FE 
 
N  N  Y   N  N  Y Firm FE  Y  N  N   Y  N  N Observations 
 
9,991  32,730  32,730   13,594  13,594  13,594 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-3,061  -16,114  -15,583   -8,653  -17,160  -16,772 Pseudo/Adjusted R²  0.273  0.275  0.299   0.162  0.315  0.352 Note: This table presents regression results for further robustness tests. Columns 1-3 (4-6) include the full sample of dividend-paying and 
non-dividend-paying firms (the subsample of dividend-paying firms). Columns 1-3 (4-6) report marginal effects for a logit regression 
(coefficients for an OLS regression) based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. 
All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. In columns 1-3 (4-6) the 
dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise (the natural 
logarithm of dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in year t). Columns 3 and 6 include alternative control variables. Columns 1 and 4, 
2 and 5, and 3 and 6 are estimated with year and firm-fixed effects, without fixed effects, and year and industry-fixed effects, respectively. I 
report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 11 
Time-Series Tests of Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Payouts 
  
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)   
 
Coef. 
(SE) 
ME  Coef. (SE) 
ME  Coef. (SE) 
ME  Coef. (SE) ME Variables 
 
INITIATE  OMIT  INCREASE  DECREASE TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.136*** -0.004  0.421*** 0.008  -0.247*** -0.061  0.037 0.004 
  
(0.048)     (0.052)     (0.035)     (0.033)    CASH_ETR 
 
0.077* 0.002  -0.222*** -0.004  0.122*** 0.030  -0.108*** -0.013 
  
(0.045)     (0.038)     (0.032)     (0.027)    CASH_FLOW 
 
0.297*** 0.009  -0.357*** -0.007  0.318*** 0.079  -0.075** -0.009 
  
(0.052)     (0.063)     (0.036)     (0.035)    SD_CASH_FLOW 
 
-0.083* -0.002  0.166*** 0.003  -0.137*** -0.034  0.182*** 0.022 
  
(0.049)     (0.043)     (0.031)     (0.027)    CASH 
 
0.196*** 0.006  0.035 0.001  0.014 0.003  -0.031 -0.004 
  
(0.047)     (0.057)     (0.033)     (0.033)    MTB 
 
-0.009 0.000  -0.195** -0.004  -0.034    -0.009  0.183*** 0.022 
  
(0.041)     (0.084)     (0.034)     (0.032)    SALES_GROWTH 
 
0.012 0.000  -0.096 -0.002  0.070*** 0.017  -0.062* -0.007 
  
(0.052)     (0.061)     (0.027)     (0.034)    ASSET_GROWTH 
 
-0.380*** -0.011  0.211*** 0.004  -0.024 -0.006  0.075*** 0.009 
  
(0.075)     (0.048)     (0.024)     (0.029)    RE_TE 
 
0.127** 0.004  -0.297*** -0.006  0.143*** 0.036  -0.161*** -0.019 
  
(0.058)     (0.063)     (0.034)     (0.032)    AGE 
 
0.173*** 0.005  -0.254*** -0.005  0.014 0.004  0.058** 0.007 
  
(0.042)     (0.051)     (0.034)     (0.030)    SIZE 
 
0.150*** 0.004  -0.577*** -0.011  0.271*** 0.067  -0.237*** -0.028 
  
(0.054)     (0.075)     (0.039)     (0.037)    LEVERAGE 
 
-0.061    -0.002  0.236*** 0.004  -0.127*** -0.032  -0.063* -0.008 
  
(0.051)     (0.062)     (0.036)     (0.036)    NOL 
 
-0.071 -0.002  0.036    0.001  -0.094*** -0.023  0.067** 0.008 
  
(0.064)     (0.044)     (0.031)     (0.028)    R&D 
 
-0.340*** -0.010  0.038 0.001  -0.034 -0.008  -0.095*** -0.011 
  
(0.069)     (0.057)     (0.038)     (0.034)    SGA 
 
0.021    0.001  0.099    0.002  -0.037    -0.009  -0.059    -0.007 
  
(0.060)     (0.068)     (0.042)     (0.037)    ADVERTISING 
 
-0.012    0.000  -0.102    -0.002  -0.009    -0.002  0.015    0.002 
  
(0.048)     (0.069)     (0.034)     (0.029)    CAP_INTENSITY 
 
0.052    0.002  -0.205*** -0.004  -0.102** -0.025  -0.020    -0.002 
  
(0.056)     (0.066)     (0.041)     (0.035)    Intercept 
 
-3.726***   -4.248***   -0.047      -1.789***     (0.216)     (0.253)     (0.099)     (0.115)    Year FE   Y  Y  Y  Y Industry FE   Y  Y  Y  Y Observations 
 
19,436  13,285  12,716  12,716 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-3,227  -1,860  -7,911  -5,176 Pseudo R²  0.093  0.208  0.099  0.049 
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Note: This table presents regression results for time-series tests of the effect of tax uncertainty on changes in 
dividend payouts over time. Columns 1-2 include firms that do not distribute dividends in years t-1 and t and firms 
that initiate dividends in year t. Columns 3-8 include firms that distribute dividends in years t-1 and t. Columns 3-4 
additionally include firms that omit dividends in year t. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 (2, 4, 6, and 8) report coefficients 
(marginal effects) for a logit regression based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous 
variables at their means. All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior 
to fitting regressions. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable, INITIATE, is an indicator variable with the value of 
one if a firm initiates dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable, OMIT, is an 
indicator variable with the value of one if a firm omits dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. In columns 5-6, the 
dependent variable, INCREASE, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm increases dividends in year t, 
and zero otherwise. In columns 7-8, the dependent variable, DECREASE, is an indicator variable with the value of 
one if a firm decreases dividends in year t, and zero otherwise. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-
fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in 
the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 12 
Tax Uncertainty and the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut 
  
(1) (2) 	 	 (3)   
 
Coef. (SE) ME 	 	 Coef. (SE) Variables 
 
DIV   DIV HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
0.351 0.023   
 
-0.060* 
	  
(0.239)    
 
(0.033) 
POST 
 
1.617*** 0.107   
 
0.057** 
	  
(0.250)    
 
(0.024) 
HIGH_TAX_UNCERTAINTY#POST 
 
-0.583** -0.039   
 
-0.053** 
   (0.270)        (0.025) 
Additional Controls 
 
Y   Y Industry FE  Y   Y 
Observations 
 
3,030   2,982 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-943   -3,123 Pseudo/Adjusted R²  0.213   0.399 Note: This table presents regression results for the effect of tax uncertainty on dividend payouts 
around the dividend tax cut introduced by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 (fiscal years 1999-2001 and fiscal years 2004-2006). Columns 1-2 (3) include a sample of firms 
that do not distribute dividends in the fiscal year 1998 (that distribute dividends during the sample 
period). Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients and marginal effects for a logit regression, respectively, 
and column 3 coefficients for an OLS regression, all based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal 
effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All variables are standardized to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting regressions. In columns 1-2 (3) the 
dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in 
year t, and zero otherwise (the natural logarithm of dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in 
year t). All regressions are estimated with industry-fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
	 	
- 62 - 
Table 13 
Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Payouts by Quartiles of SD_CASH_FLOW 
Panel A: Tax Uncertainty and the Probability of Dividend Payouts     
  
(1) 	 (2)  (3)  (4)   
 
ME (SE) 	 ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE) Subsamples 
 
Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.090***  -0.105***  -0.086***  -0.071***    (0.072)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.065) Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y Year FE 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y Industry FE  Y  Y  Y  Y Observations 
 
8,188  8,182  8,183  8,177 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-3,906  -4,100  -4,044  -3,399 Pseudo R²  0.295  0.274  0.250  0.248 
         
Panel B: Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Levels     
  
(1) 	 (2)  (3)  (4) 		
 
Coef. (SE) 	 Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Subsamples 
 
Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY -0.098***  -0.045  -0.121***  -0.103*** 
    (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry FE   Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  3,404  3,397  3,401  3,392 
Likelihood Ratio  -3,784  -3,931  -4,187  -4,544 
Adjusted R²  0.350  0.362  0.351  0.387 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the effect of tax uncertainty on 
the probability of dividend payouts (Panel A) and dividend levels (Panel B). Panel A (B) includes 
the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms (the subsample of dividend-
paying firms). In both Panels, I estimate regressions by annual quartiles of SD_CASH_FLOW. 
Panel A (B) reports marginal effects for a logit regression (coefficients for an OLS regression) 
based on Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their 
means. All variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
prior to fitting regressions. In Panel A (B), the dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable 
with the value of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise (the natural 
logarithm of dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in year t). All regressions are estimated 
with year and industry-fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by firm in parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 14 
Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Payouts by Quartiles of CASH_ETR 
Panel A: Tax Uncertainty and the Probability of Dividend Payouts     
  
(1) 	 (2)  (3)  (4)   
 
ME (SE) 	 ME (SE)  ME (SE)  ME (SE) Subsamples 
 
Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.008  -0.081***  -0.166***  -0.110***    (0.046)  (0.071)  (0.079)  (0.080) Additional Controls 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y Year FE 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y Industry FE  Y  Y  Y  Y Observations 
 
8,188  8,182  8,183  8,177 Likelihood Ratio 
 
-3,532  -3,874  -4,037  -3,793 Pseudo R²  0.258  0.314  0.285  0.310 
         
Panel B: Tax Uncertainty and Dividend Levels   
  
(1) 	 (2)  (3)  (4) 		
 
Coef. (SE) 	 Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE)  Coef. (SE) Subsamples 
 
Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 Variables 
 
DIV  DIV  DIV  DIV TAX_UNCERTAINTY -0.017  -0.114***  -0.162***  -0.166*** 
    (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.034) Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry FE   Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  3,404  3,397  3,401  3,392 Likelihood Ratio  -4,477  -4,048  -3,836  -4,106 
Adjusted R²  0.297  0.321  0.413  0.393 
Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the effect of tax uncertainty on 
the probability of dividend payouts (Panel A) and dividend levels (Panel B). Panel A (B) includes 
the full sample of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms (the subsample of dividend-
paying firms). In both Panels, I estimate regressions by annual quartiles of CASH_ETR. Panel A 
(B) reports marginal effects for a logit regression (coefficients for an OLS regression) based on 
Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All 
variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting 
regressions. In Panel A (B), the dependent variable, DIV, is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if a firm declares dividends in year t, and zero otherwise (the natural logarithm of 
dividends in year t and scaled by total assets in year t). All regressions are estimated with year 
and industry-fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in 
parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 15 
Tax Uncertainty and Share Repurchases 
  
(1) (2)   (3)  		
 
Coef. (SE) ME   Coef. (SE)  Variables 
 
REPU   REPU  TAX_UNCERTAINTY 
 
-0.195*** -0.048       -0.083***  
  
(0.023)       (0.021)    CASH_ETR 
 
0.133*** 0.033       0.115***  
	  
(0.019)       (0.019)    CASH_FLOW 
 
0.282*** 0.069       0.477***  
	  
(0.024)       (0.022)    SD_CASH_FLOW 
 
-0.094*** -0.023       -0.025  
	  
(0.022)       (0.020)    CASH 
 
0.116*** 0.029       0.104***  
	  
(0.029)       (0.024)    MTB 
 
0.059** 0.014       0.219***  
	  
(0.027)       (0.021)    SALES_GROWTH 
 
-0.161*** -0.040       -0.068***  
	  
(0.018)       (0.018)    ASSET_GROWTH 
 
-0.252*** -0.062       -0.381***  
	  
(0.018)       (0.018)    RE_TE 
 
0.275*** 0.068       0.158***  
	  
(0.028)       (0.023)    AGE 
 
0.023 0.006       -0.064***  
	  
(0.025)       (0.022)    SIZE 
 
0.479*** 0.118       0.195***  
	  
(0.032)       (0.025)    LEVERAGE 
 
-0.077*** -0.019       -0.147***  
	  
(0.026)       (0.023)    NOL 
 
0.046** 0.011       -0.011  
	  
(0.021)       (0.020)    R&D 
 
0.027 0.007       0.222***  
	  
(0.028)       (0.022)    SGA 
 
0.068** 0.017       0.031  
	  
(0.032)       (0.028)    ADVERTISING 
 
0.082*** 0.020       0.009  
	  
(0.027)       (0.023)    CAP_INTENSITY 
 
-0.099*** -0.024       -0.180***  
  
(0.028)       (0.026)    Intercept 
 
0.769***     -3.705***     (0.068)         (0.058)     
Year FE 
 
Y   Y  Industry FE  Y   Y  Observations 
 
31,145   17,288  Likelihood Ratio 
 
-18,894   -33,174  Pseudo/Adjusted R²  0.117   0.260  
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Note: This table presents regression results for tests that examine the effect of tax uncertainty on 
share repurchases. Columns 1-2 (3) include a sample of share-repurchasing and non-share-
repurchasing firms (share-repurchasing firms). Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients and marginal 
effects for a logit regression, respectively and column 3 coefficients for an OLS regression, all based 
on Equation (1). I calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. All 
variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to fitting 
regressions. In columns 1-2 (3) the dependent variable, REPU, is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if a firm repurchases shares in year t, and zero otherwise (the natural logarithm of share 
repurchases in year t and scaled by total assets in year t). All regressions are estimated with year and 
industry-fixed effects. I report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm in 
parentheses. I define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
